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Abstract 
We examine the synchronisation of the European Union (EU) financial markets before and during the 
2007 global financial crisis. We use an Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-GARCH 
framework to control for the time-varying correlations and a Markov-Switching model to identify regime 
changes. Our sample considers 27 EU nations for the period 2000-2011. For each nation we formulate 
several characteristics of the crisis such as, synchronicity, duration and intensity measures. We find that 
the more recent EU members had a lagged entry to the crisis regime, were less adversely affected, show 
higher correlation between their stock markets and have their credit scores being revised more frequently 
relative to established EU members. We also find that higher levels of sovereign debt and lower levels of 
industrialisation positively impact crisis duration and intensity.  Our results refute the notion of uniform 
integration of EU financial markets as evident from the highly non-synchronised observed crisis 
experience among the EU members. As such, one-size fits all policies are likely to be ineffective.  
Keywords: Contagion • Global Financial Crisis • Synchronisation • Intensity • Duration • ADCC-
GARCH • European Union  
JEL Classification: F36 • G15 
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades global financial markets have become highly integrated as evident by the intensity 
and coverage of the recent global financial crisis that originated in the US and resonated across the globe. 
European financial markets were amongst the hardest hit, partially due to their high interconnection with 
the US market, but also due to the increased integration within the European Union (EU).  
The increased integration, efficiency and functionality of the financial system in the European Union 
ranks high within the EU economic agendas.
2
 Indeed, these are seen as essential elements for the effective 
implementation of European Central Bank (ECB) economic policies (ECB, 2010). Till the recent past, 
high economic and financial integration have always been associated with prosperity and economic 
wellbeing. But is financial integration always desirable? On one hand it facilitates the functioning of a 
―Single Market‖, and acts as a medium via which financial instability may spread, manifested by 
excessive co-movements among asset prices which exceed those set by fundamentals. However, as weak 
economic fundamentals in one nation are brought into the spotlight by a financial crisis, investors may 
fear that other nations have similar traits; thus spreading financial contagion (Masson 1999). For example, 
towards the end of 2009, when problems in Greece were traced to severe fiscal/debt issues, the fear grew 
of similar scenarios within Italy and Portugal. Increased financial integration, liquid financial markets and 
new financial products (e.g., credit default swaps), create transmission channels that allow contagion to 
spread more rapidly (Baele, 2005; Calvo, 1998). Although financial crises invite the search for evidence 
of financial contagion, it is more pertinent to question whether contagion is synchronised across the EU 
countries. Synchronisation would uphold the concept of the Single Market, whilst the idea of a ―two-
speed EU‖ would receive support if contagion were not synchronised. 
In two consecutive phases between 2004 and 2007 the number of EU members
3
 increased from 15 to 27. 
Although many of the 12 New Member States (hereafter NMS) display common economic features, 
others are disparate, either between themselves or compared to earlier EU members. For instance, the per 
capita GDP of Cyprus is twice that of Poland, while stock markets in the former satellite states of the 
Soviet Union, i.e., the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) nations, have very small market capitalisation. 
The popular representation of the hard-working North versus the lazy-South has also received much 
attention and highlights the lack of uniformity within the EU (Charlemagne, 2010). Despite such 
differences, some of the NMS committed themselves to the further step of integration by joining the 
Eurozone.  
In recognising the varying degree of integration across EU nations, this paper examines the experience of 
a correlated-information channel type of financial contagion in light of the global financial crisis for the 
EU equity markets. The encompassing term experience refers to the existence, the synchronisation, the 
duration and the intensity of the financial contagion effects across the EU members. 
For this purpose, we adopt an Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-Markov Switching 
(MS)-GARCH model, which captures dynamic correlations and identifies regime change. The ADCC-
GARCH allows the disentangling of negative and positive shocks in the volatility and/or correlation 
process (Gjika and Horváth, 2013), which makes an ideal candidate in the context of our study. The 
                                                     
2 Financial integration is a priority for the Euro system. See the mission statement at: www.ecb.europa.eu. 
3 With its accession in July 2013, Croatia is the 28th member of the EU. It is however excluded from our study due to data 
limitations. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
4 
 
Markov-Switching Regime model of Hamilton (1994) provides an appealing framework to endogenously 
identify crisis events. Our sample consists of all the EU-27 nations‘ equity markets observed over the 
period 2000-2011. The sample size, range and nation classifications (i.e., nations are arranged into six 
groups) allow us to draw more insights into the behaviour of the EU nations particularly during the period 
of market distress. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature in four ways. First, we present crisis transition date estimates 
for all EU-27 nations. Previous studies have either not studied the entire EU or have imposed an 
exogenous crisis transition date, implicitly assuming a singular crisis timing date for all. Second, we 
provide measures that gauge contagion duration and intensity. To the best of our knowledge the extant 
literature does not attempt to compare and contrast the contagion experiences of different countries. 
Third, we assess the impact of financial contagion on intra-EU integration. It has been suggested that co-
movements are a reflection of integration within respective markets (Bekaert et al., 2009). However, there 
is evidence (albeit limited) that such co-movements may be driven by intra-EU (as opposed to EU-wide) 
integration patterns; see for example, Gębka and Karoglou (2013). Fourth, and to the best of our 
knowledge, we provide the first integrated estimation on an extended data set of an ADCC-GARCH type 
of model with Markov-Switching models.
4
  
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. In the broadest terms, the former EU members are 
affected earlier than the NMS. Where Core EU members are generally hit by the financial crisis around 
late July 2007, the effects reach the NMS more than a year later. The duration of the crisis has been more 
prolonged for the former EU members and the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in 
particular, while for the NMS the duration has been significantly lower. Crisis intensity measures finds 
that the Core EU has been most adversely affected by the crisis. Overall, integration in financial markets 
seems to have been affected by the global financial crisis, while the results presented here suggest that 
differences between the EU nation groups may have widened. 
This section is the first of six. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the literature. Sections 3 and 4 outline 
the data and the methodology. Findings are provided in section 5 which is followed by final conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 From Integration to Contagion 
Financial integration in the EU entered a new era in the years preceding the introduction of the single 
currency
5
 with many studies documenting evidence of increased co-movements in national stock markets 
(Hardouvelis et al., 2006; Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2010; Asgharian and Nossman, 2011 among others). In 
the early 21
st
 century, stock markets in the EU members featured low volatility, high correlation, and 
reduced portfolio diversification benefits (Kim et al., 2005; Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2009; Savva, 2009; 
Bekaert et al., 2013).  
                                                     
4 We are aware that univariate GARCH and Markov-Switching models have been estimated in a single step (Bauwens et al., 
2014; 2010; Augustyniak, 2014; Marcucci, 2005). Pelletier (2006) has offered an example of a DCC-GARCH with Markov-
Switching. 
5 The Euro was launched on 1 January 1999 and replaced by 2002 the national currencies. For more information we direct you to 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/intro/html/map.en.html  
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Despite the benefits from financial integration during times of tranquillity, it brings detrimental effects 
during times of economic and/or financial instability. Homogeneous financial integration would 
propagate shocks more easily across the EU giving rise to increased correlations between stock markets in 
what has been generally termed as financial contagion (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Lee and Kim, 1993; 
Calvo et al., 1996; Baig and Goldfajn, 1998). However, the asymmetric response of EU nations to 
external shocks has been indicative of the degree of heterogeneity in EU financial integration (Clayes and 
Vasicek, 2014). In that context, even if a crisis has been correctly anticipated, the presence, duration and 
intensity of financial contagion in every nation cannot be predicted. As such, it may be plausibly argued 
that from the two situations, the former may be preferable from certain viewpoints (e.g., a regulator‘s) as 
the same ―treatment‖ should be applied in all nations. Where some nations have been heavily exposed to 
financial contagion while others have weathered the storm may be trickier as it could give rise to further 
instability, dichotomy of suggested approaches at a policy-making level and inevitably discussions about 
a ―two-speed Europe‖ (Gębka and Karoglou, 2013). Ultimately, and as argued in Yang et al., (2003) and 
Bley (2009), financial integration differentials across time and EU-wide, may undermine the pursuit of 
the Single Market‘s ultimate goal. 
The CEE group has occupied much of the literature testing for financial contagion over different phases 
of its integration with the EU/Eurozone. Early studies with a focus in the mid-90s conclude that 
integration levels amongst CEE stock markets and with the rest of the EU are low; see for example 
Kasch-Haroutounian and Price (2001) and Scheicher (2001). CEE stock markets have shown no signs nor 
symptoms of financial contagion (contrary to the EU-15) in light of earlier economic crises (i.e. the 
Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian collapse of 1998, the Brazilian 
devaluation of 1999 and the dot.com bubble of 2000), which has been attributed to their low degree of 
financial integration (Serwa and Bohl 2005; Gelos and Sahay, 2001). Following accession talks, the 
introduction of the single currency, financial openness and increased interest of foreign investors, 
integration in the CEE group increases and stock-market co-movements became more pronounced (Wang 
and Moore, 2008; Savva and Aslanidis, 2010; Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011). CEE stock and bond 
markets exhibited financial contagion following the global financial crisis, as evidenced in the study of 
Chmielewska (2010). 
2.2 Financial Contagion: Transmission Channels and Identification 
Definitions of contagion may vary according to the transmission channel under study.  Examples of 
transmission channels include the liquidity, the wealth effect, the risk-premium and the correlated-
information. The liquidity channel is typically relevant to foreign financial institutions restricting liquidity 
in the host country as they adjust their positions in an attempt to meet with regulatory requirements and/or 
mitigate anticipated/realized losses in their home country (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Predatory 
trading can exacerbate the destabilizing effect of the liquidity channel (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009). Contagion may be aggravated by wealth effect channels as traders with limited capacity for 
bearing risks liquidate their positions in the markets they operate (Kyle and Xiong, 2001). Such traders 
may rely on global variance risk premium, a proxy for economic uncertainty that can provide increased 
accuracy for the individual country return/risk predictability (Bollerslev et al., 2014). For a detailed 
exposition of the contagion transmission channels we direct you to Pericoli and Sbracia, (2003). 
Implementation problems can arise due to the complex nature of some of these channels as argued in 
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Dimitriou et al., (2013). The focus of this study is the correlated information channel, which posits that a 
shock in a financial market works as a signal, potentially affecting other financial markets. 
From an identification viewpoint, contagion refers to the spread of financial disturbances among 
countries. Such disturbances can be represented as crisis probabilities; see for example Eichengreen et al., 
(1999) where contagion is defined as a rise in the probability that a nation experiences a crisis given that a 
crisis exists in another nation. A complementary view emphasized by Bekaert et al., (2005) is that 
contagion is identified by correlations beyond those that may be explained by economic fundamentals. 
Here, the challenge is to determine the fundamental factors, and whether to use observable variables or 
latent variables estimated by complex econometric techniques such as factor analysis.
6 Forbes (2001) 
suggests yet another definition: an increase in cross-market linkages following an economic shock in one 
nation. This ―shift-contagion‖ (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) highlights three main issues: international 
diversification; effectiveness of international institutions and bail-out funds; and propagation mechanisms 
(Billio and Caporin 2005). An advantage of the ―shift-contagion‖ definition is that it makes use of 
correlation values (therefore integrates nicely with the correlated information channel) that are both 
intuitively straightforward to interpret and integrate well within financial integration framework (Bekaert 
et al., 2009).  
In the ―shift-contagion‖ framework, testing for financial contagion typically amounts to tests of statistical 
significance between normal periods and crisis periods. In this manner, King and Wadhwani (1990) and 
Lee and Kim (1993) verify contagion across major stock markets following the 1987 US stock market 
crash.
7
 This approach has also been applied in the wake of the 1994 Mexican crisis for stock and bond 
markets (Calvo et al. 1996). In similar fashion, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) investigate the contagion effects 
of the 1997 East Asian crisis on stock and bond markets, currency exchange values and interest rates. 
A drawback of the ―shift-contagion‖ methodology relates to the heteroskedasticity induced bias on 
financial contagion tests (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). However, the innovation of multivariate GARCH 
models
8
 that produce time-varying correlation coefficients has surpassed these problems and re-energised 
interest in financial contagion studies (Engle 2002; Tse and Tsui, 2002). Much of this research is focused 
on exchange rates (Khalid and Rajaguru, 2005), bond markets (Coudert and Gex, 2010) and stock markets 
(Chiang et al., 2007). From their investigation of nine East Asian exchanges (1990 - 2003) using a DCC-
GARCH framework the latter authors find evidence of contagion after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Cho and Parhizgari (2008) obtain similar findings from a larger sample of 14 nations. Yiu et al., (2010) 
and Naoui et al., (2010) find evidence of contagion between the US and East Asia for the 1997 East 
Asian, the 2000 dot.com and the 2007 financial crises. Kenourgios et al., (2011) verifies financial 
contagion from the crisis country to a set of emerging and developed countries for the 1997 East Asian 
                                                     
6 For financial contagion to be verified through this technique there should be statistically significant evidence of correlation in 
the model‘s residuals. However, the identification of financial contagion may be inversely related to the models‘ performance, 
which could explain why Baele and Inghelbrecht (2010) fail to find contagion with their optimal model, but document contagion 
evidence once a more restricted model is used. 
7 On the October 19th 1987 the Dow Jones fell 22.6%, the largest one day fall to date. 
8 Prior to the introduction of Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models, correlations were either assumed to be time-
invariant or their estimation would suffer from the ‗dimensionality curse‘, as witnessed by VEC and BEKK models, as described 
in Engle and Kroner (1995). As a consequence, most empirical work has been either: a) restricted to a limited number of nations, 
or b) assumed time-invariant correlations so that estimation parameters are kept low. Several studies have looked at contagion 
across a limited number of nations to avoid the aforementioned econometric problems. For instance, Hamao et al. (1990) test for 
contagion between Japan, the UK and the US in the wake of the 1987 US stock market crash, while Edwards and Susmel (2003) 
focus on how the Mexican devaluation of 1994 was manifested upon the bond markets of Argentina and Chile. 
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crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 2000 dot.com and the two Brazilian crises in 1997-98 and 2002. The 
global financial crisis has been a focal point with several studies investigating contagion in a cross-
country (Suh, 2015; Ludwig, 2014; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012), a cross-
industry (Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015) or a combined basis (Bekaert et al., 2014) focusing on stock, 
CDS and implied volatility markets among others.
9
  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use daily stock market indices from Datastream for 27 EU nations from 1
st
 January 2001 until 27
th
 
September 2011, giving a sample of 2,800 observations.
10
 For each of the indices, the continuously 
compounded percentage returns are calculated as         
  
          , where    is the closing price 
at day  .11 Initially the EU-27 nations are divided into two groups corresponding to the EU-15 and the 
NMS. Subsequently each of these broad groups is split into three sub-groups as follows. The EU-15 sub-
groups are: Core EU (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the UK), 
Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain). 
The Scandinavian nations share a common history and significant trade linkages. Further, Denmark and 
Sweden opted not to join the Eurozone. Recent discussions relating to competitiveness, fiscal deficits and 
public debt problems underpin the PIIGS group of nations, see for example, Gębka and Karoglou (2013). 
The NMS sub-groups are: Baltics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and the Recently Acceded Member 
States (RAMS) which are divided into RAMS I (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and 
RAMS II (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Romania and Slovakia). The Baltics are linked by their proximity, 
common history and common ownership of stock markets by the OMX. RAMS I and RAMS II are defined 
by the three-year difference in the starting dates of their negotiation talks with the EU. Table 1 presents 
the group classifications together with the equity indices under consideration. 
 [Table 1 here] 
Table 2 summarizes key financial and macroeconomic indicators for the EU nations that provide prima 
facie evidence of heterogeneity. Stock market capitalization - a measure of the development of domestic 
financial markets - is reported as a percentage of GDP in 2010. Overall, financial markets are more 
developed in the EU-15 compared to the NMS with capitalisation figures ranging between 183.55% for 
Luxembourg and 4.66% for Slovakia. The results are consistent with the efficient market hypothesis
12
 for 
a majority of the EU-15 nations but not for the NMS. This can be partially attributed to the shorter history 
                                                     
9 We are aware of the existence of other techniques to estimate contagion. The DCC approach is similar and compares rather well 
to other techniques available in the literature. Moreover, the DCC approach is easy to implement and interpret.  
10 Complete coverage for some of the New Member States is not available prior to this date. 
11 Several studies are mindful of an induced bias when stock markets operate during different trading hours (Kahya, 1997; Burns 
et al., 1998; Martens and Poon, 2001). This is particularly relevant when dealing with countries across a large variety of time 
zones (e.g., UK, US, Japan) and/or countries operating a different business week (for example, the business week in the Arab 
Gulf countries is Sunday to Thursday). Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) lag US returns to accommodate the different trading hours 
of US and European markets. Similarly, Kenourgios et al. (2014) use two-day moving averages. However, this becomes of little 
concern as all EU stock markets operate within a maximum of a two-hour difference. To accommodate for time differences, we 
use of daily closing prices as suggested in Gębka and Karoglou (2013). 
12 We apply the Wald-Wolfowitz test (also known as runs test), first used by Fama (1965) to test the weak form of the efficient 
market hypothesis. The null hypothesis states that each element in a ―run‖ is independent and identically distributed. Failure to 
reject the null provides support for the efficient market hypothesis.  
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of financial intermediation in the majority of the NMS. Their stock markets were developed with their 
transition from communism in the early 1990s. In terms of the macroeconomic environment, there are 
signs of recovery from the crisis towards the end of our sample period, with Luxembourg recording 
positive annual GDP growth (3.52%). By contrast, signs indicative of poor financial conditions and on-
going problems are still evident in Finland (-8.20%). The PIIGS show greater similarity with the NMS in 
certain respects. For example, stock market capitalisation is lower in the PIIGS compared to the Core-EU 
and the Scandinavian groups, while Italy and Portugal were the only nations of the group to record a 
positive GDP growth in 2010. 
 [Table 2 here] 
Table 3 provides stock market descriptive statistics for the EU-27 nations for the sample period. In 
general, returns are higher for the NMS compared to the EU-15. The PIIGS group had the worst 
performance, with an average return of -0.025%, with the figure for Greece being the lowest at -0.052% 
and Spain the highest at -0.003%. Similarly, the Core EU group had an average daily return of -0.002%, 
with the highest and lowest occurring in Germany (0.043%) and the Netherlands (-0.029%) respectively. 
By contrast, the groups constituting the NMS enjoyed positive average returns ranging from 0.016% 
(RAMS II) to 0.043% (Baltics). The annualized volatility and value-at-risk (VaR)
13
 measures reflect the 
turbulent economic environment. For instance, VaR classifies the financial market of Germany 
(Luxembourg) as being the least (most) risky. Note that, at the outbreak of the financial crisis, the 
Luxembourg stock market index lost about 85% of its value, possibly a reaction to the investment re-
shuffling of a number of money market funds domiciled in the nation due to the favourable tax and legal 
environment (KPMG, 2011; PwC, 2008). 
[Table 3 here] 
4. Methodology 
This section outlines the estimation techniques adopted in this study. We consider an asymmetric 
dynamic conditional correlations (ADCC) GARCH model, similar to Gjika and Horváth (2013). This 
model accounts for both the time varying nature and asymmetry of the cross-movement of volatilities. To 
identify regime changes and crisis transition dates we use a Markov-switching framework, following 
Mandilaras and Bird (2010). This framework is incorporated within the ADCC-GARCH estimation, 
similar to Marcucci (2005).
14
 Therefore our general model may be termed as an ADCC-MS-GARCH. We 
construct measures of crisis synchronicity, duration and intensity. Cerda (2009) provides several measures 
of crisis duration, albeit in a different context, which are notionally aligned to those we report. Although 
there has been discussion on the extent of crisis synchronicity and intensity - see for example Claeys and 
Vasicek, (2014); Gębka and Karoglou, (2013) - ours is the first attempt to quantify these concepts in a 
financial contagion framework. We provide extensive analysis of the conditional correlation measures 
from two viewpoints; an EU-wide and an intra-EU. These measures enable us to assess the impact of the 
                                                     
13 Value at Risk (VaR) estimates the worst 1-day ahead loss at a given confidence level. VaR is calculated as the 5th percentile of 
the stock market returns, thus avoiding any assumptions pertaining to the normality of the return distribution.  
14 Univariate models of the DCC-GARCH are essentially Markov-Switching GARCH models. These generally suffer from the 
―path dependency‖ problem. One way to deal with this issue is for their estimation to be done through certain modifications on 
the likelihood function (see for example Gray, 1996; Glynn and Haas, 2004 and Klaassen, 2002). Other methods include the use 
of GMM methods (Francq and Zakoian, 2008), Bayesian (Bauwens et al., 2010; 2014) or ―quasi‖-Bayesian techniques 
(Augustyniak, 2014).  
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financial crisis on the dynamics of co-movements between EU stock markets, and whether these are due 
to the respective market‘s integration with the rest of the EU, or due to regional, intra-EU integration. 
4.1 Dynamic Conditional Correlation  
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)-GARCH models were introduced separately by Engle (2002) 
and Tse and Tsui (2002), with the two approaches differing in the parameterisation of the conditional 
correlation matrix. Subsequent extensions of DCC-GARCH models are of two kinds. The first is in the 
volatility modelling phase where the univariate GARCH has been superseded by models that account for 
asymmetries (EGARCH), long-memory (FIGARCH) and regime changes (MS-GARCH). The second 
relates to the DCC estimator itself, with the corrected DCC-GARCH model proposed by Aielli (2013) 
providing an alternative, asymptotically unbiased, estimator.
15
 Further extensions include the asymmetric 
DCC (ADCC) model, which allows for asymmetric effects to impact the conditional correlations 
(Cappiello et al., 2006). 
In general, the estimation of an ADCC-GARCH type of model consists of three phases (Engle, 2002). In 
the first phase, univariate GARCH models are fitted to the asset returns. In the second phase, the 
unconditional correlation and covariance matrices of both standardised returns and negative standardised 
returns are estimated. The third phase consists of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure for 
the conditional correlation dynamics.  
To outline the framework consider a     vector of asset returns in which,    is normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance     
                 (1)  
 
  
       
 
   
    
     
 
   
    
  
(2)  
 
Where      is the information set at time    , and the variance process is characterised by a GARCH 
process. 
For the     matrix of asset returns the time-varying covariance matrix    is defined as a product of 
time-varying standard deviations and time-varying correlations as follows: 
            (3)  
where 
            
   
      
   
  (4)  
To incorporate asymmetries in the correlation dynamics Cappiello et al., (2006) modify the conditional 
correlation equation of Engle (2002) to the one given below:  
                                                     
15 Note though that the bias of the DCC-GARCH estimator is negligible even in large samples (Caporin and McAleer 2014). 
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(5)  
where    takes the value 1 when      , zero otherwise, representing therefore bad news. For the matrix 
   to be positive definite, a set of restrictions is imposed. These restrictions require that: i)     ; ii) 
    ; iii)      ; iv)    
 
       
 
        
 
      and    maximum 
eigenvalue              is estimated from the data. A rescaling of Qt ensures that the correlation 
matrix is well-defined with unitary values along the main diagonal and with each off-diagonal element 
ranging in absolute value between zero and one (Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta 2008). The formula for the 
rescaling of correlations is: 
          
            
     (6)  
where   is the identity matrix and   denotes the Hadamard product. 
For the multivariate part of our setting (the univariate is described in the next section), we adopt an 
ADCC (1, 1, 1), following Gjika and Horváth (2013) among others. This is given by: 
                          
             
         (7)  
4.2 Regime Change and Markov-Switching Models 
Common to financial contagion studies adopting a DCC-GARCH framework, is the assumption of an 
exogenous crisis date. Although this may be plausible for narrow studies, it may be quite restrictive in a 
multi-nation EU. Several studies have suggested alternative techniques to ameliorate this problem. For 
example, Olbrys and Majewska (2014) divide market states into ―up‖ and ―down‖ markets in an attempt 
to assess the timing of crisis periods for the CEE stock markets. Dividing the volatility series according to 
the timing of structural breaks prior to testing for financial contagion is followed in Blatt et al., (2014).  
Markov-switching models, introduced by Hamilton (1994), permit the endogenous estimation of crisis 
dates, while determining the prevalence of one of two regimes
16
; a tranquil, relatively stable regime of the 
economy and a turbulent one that intuitively corresponds to a crisis regime. Mandilaras and Bird (2010) 
use a Markov-switching in a VAR setting to detect contagion effects in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) for 9 countries over the period 1978 - 1993. Baele (2005) find that volatility spillovers to 13 
European stock markets - from within the EU and the USA over the period 1980-2001 - have been 
intensified during the crisis regimes, which are identified via a Markov-switching model. 
A Markov-Switching set-up allows transition probabilities to be estimated, from one state of the economy 
to another.
17
 Markov-Switching models rely on the data to identify the timing of the shift.
18
 Typically a 
                                                     
16 Markov-switching models can be estimated for more than two regimes. However, as the number of regimes increases the 
computational burden gets more pronounced without a clear benefit in terms of interpretation. 
17 The Markov-Switching model of Hamilton (1994) belongs to the family of non-linear models which includes SETAR (Tong 
1990) and LSTAR models (Teräsvirta 1994). For a broader discussion of these models the reader is directed to Tsay (2010). 
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latent state variable      is used to denote which of the   states the economy is in period   with    
          . With a typical Markov-switching model for a crisis and a calm regime, regime specific 
means and volatilities may be written as: 
                           (8)  
with the regime transition probabilities are given as: 
                            (9)  
In our case we adopt the Markov-Switching GARCH (1,1) as our univariate model: 
                           (10)  
      
         
     
     
     
  (11)  
The Markov-Switching GARCH (1,1) model outlined above is the first phase of the multivariate ADCC-
GARCH model we utilise and allows for all parameters to depend on the (latent) state of the economy.
19
 
4.3 Synchronization, Duration and Intensity Measures 
A way to compare the financial crisis experience within the EU countries is to look at crisis 
synchronisation, duration and intensity measures. To assess the synchronisation of the financial crisis, we 
compare the estimated crisis transition dates for each individual EU nation with a benchmark date. As 
benchmark, we utilise the 1/8/2007 which corresponds to the onset of the US sub-prime crisis (Hwang et 
al., 2010; BIS, 2009).
20  
  
Synchronization of the onset of the crisis is expressed in days and is given as: 
                   (12)  
where   denotes the nation,     denotes the crisis transition date for each nation and         corresponds to 
the crisis benchmark date. Positive (negative) values indicate a lag (lead) in the transition, relative to the 
benchmark date for the particular country. 
The duration of crisis is measured as the time that a nation has spent within the crisis regime, as identified 
by the Markov-switching model. It is expressed in days and as a percentage and given as: 
                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Strictly speaking, a Markov-switching model employs a state variable which is governed by a first-order Markov chain; thus 
leaving no room for explanatory variables. The more generic time-varying transition probability models may include explanatory 
variables to determine the regime of the economy at the cost, however, of greater complication (Filardo, 1994). 
19 It is also possible to allow for different regimes in the conditional correlation process (i.e., the ADCC phase), see for example 
Pelletier (2006) and Cappiello et al., (2006) for approaches with Markov switching regimes and exogenously defined structural 
breaks respectively. 
20 Changing the benchmark date to the collapse of the Lehman brothers (15/9/08), which corresponds to the end of the 1st phase 
of the global financial crisis (BIS, 2009) does not challenge our qualitative findings. 
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(13)  
 
              
   
 
      
      
   
 
      
 
(14)  
where      denotes the crisis regime. 
Intensity of financial crisis is defined as the logarithmic change in the average volatility level between the 
crisis and calm regimes in the period following the crisis transition date for each nation. Intensity is 
expressed as a percentage where a higher (lower) value denotes a more (less) pronounced impact of the 
financial crisis for the particular nation. Intensity is expressed as a percentage and is given as:  
 
               
     
 
      
        
 
      
       
     
 
      
         
 
      
       
  
(15)  
where      denotes the conditional volatility.  
4.4 Financial Contagion Measures 
Estimates obtained from the ADCC-MS-GARCH model are used to assess the financial contagion in the 
EU. We construct two correlation indicators that capture EU-wide and intra-EU integration. The EU-wide 
measure is calculated as the average of the conditional correlation coefficients between a respective 
nation and all other nations in the sample. For the intra-EU measure, each nation group is considered in 
isolation; therefore only conditional correlation coefficients among nations in their respective group are 
considered. The two conditional measures are each given as: 
 
                    
 
   
 
   
       
(16)  
 
 
                     
  
    
  
    
       
(17)  
where    is the estimated conditional correlation coefficient from the ADCC model,   is the cross-
sectional dimension,    denotes the nations in each of the nation groups.  
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients, standard errors, goodness-of-fit statistics and transition 
probabilities for the univariate MS-GARCH models for all the EU-27 nations of the sample. Estimated 
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coefficients are highly significant.
21
 The estimated coefficients obtained under the two regimes (calm / 
crisis) reveal varying volatility dynamics. Overall the non-linear framework provides a good 
approximation of volatility, as evidenced by the linearity test. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients 
of the ADCC model, which are statistically significant. The significantly positive estimate of the 
asymmetric term, the information criteria and a likelihood ratio test suggest that the ADCC has a slightly 
better fit than the standard DCC, as it captures asymmetric effects in the conditional correlations.
22
 
[Table 4 around here] 
[Table 5 around here] 
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the evolution of stock price indices for France and the Czech Republic, which 
we use as illustrative cases for the EU-15 and the NMS nation groups respectively.
23
 In the early 2000‘s, 
the French stock market experienced a steep downward trend following the burst of the dot.com bubble. 
Thereafter, an upward trend is evident until the global financial crisis, after which the stock market has 
fallen sharply. A recovery phase is evident post 2009 but the index remains below pre-crisis levels. The 
stock market in the Czech Republic shows similar patterns with the exception of the downward trend that 
followed the dot.com crisis. Panel B, displays the calm / crisis regimes identified by the Markov-
Switching model for the volatility in the two nations‘ stock market indices. The shaded areas represent 
periods of turmoil with marked differences in their timing and duration, constituting evidence in favour of 
varying crisis profiles. Figure 2 shows the crisis transition date for all EU-27 nations. The figure clearly 
shows a wide disparity in the transition dates, which spread over 623 days, across the different nations.  
[Figure 1 and 2 here] 
5.1 Synchronization, Duration and Intensity of the Crisis 
Table 6 reports the crisis experience indicators for every nation and nation group in the sample. 
Specifically, column II reports the crisis transition dates estimated from the Markov-switching models. 
Columns III – VI report the calculated measures of crisis synchronization, duration and intensity. 
Columns VII – VIII relate to sovereign credit rating score revisions, showing the date immediately pre 
and post the crisis transition date.
24
 Columns IX – X show the lead/lag between the credit score change 
and the crisis transition dates. 
 [Table 6 here] 
A. Synchronisation 
                                                     
21 As a robustness check we implement a MS-EGARCH(1,1) which accounts for asymmetries in the volatility process. The 
results (which are not reported) bring no definite improvement over the more parsimonious MS-GARCH(1,1). Hence, for 
consistency purposes, we proceed with the MS-GARCH(1,1) specification for all nations. 
22 As a robustness check, we have cross-checked the crisis transition dates from the Markov Switching framework with those 
provided by a Zivot-Andrews test (1998) on the conditional volatility of the equity indices. The results show that the dates 
provided by the two approaches are closely aligned. 
23 Owing to space limitations we only report two illustrative graphs for two countries, one from the EU-15 and one from the 
NMS groups. Graphs for all nations are available upon request. 
24 Credit rating scores are obtained from Fitch ratings. The majority of the updates relate to downgrades or to negative switches in 
the outlook.   
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Our results refute the notion that all nations experienced a synchronised transition into a crisis regime. 
One interpretation is that some EU countries were affected with a significant delay by the global financial 
crisis (GFC). A second interpretation is that, although these countries were directly unaffected by the 
GFC, they were hit when the effects of the direct impact spread to their economic sectors. The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS, 2009) and the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis (2009) have provided 
official timelines that place the GFC in four phases.
25
 The vast majority of the estimated crisis transition 
dates fall into the first period. Therefore, we believe that the first interpretation receives empirical support 
from our data. 
The EU-15 nations, the most synchronised group, enter the crisis regime with an average lag of 8 days 
relative to the crisis transition date benchmark.
26
 Conversely, the NMS lags by 165 days and features a 
wider dispersion between group members. The latter, may relate to their belated entry to the EU and their 
lower degree of integration. For example, the RAMS I and II groups show a difference of around 107 
days in their synchronization of transition to the crisis regime. The non-synchronized transition among 
Core EU nations is best illustrated by Germany and Luxembourg cases. Relative to the Core EU group 
average, Germany‘s entry to the crisis regime lags by 97 days whereas Luxembourg‘s leads by 153 days. 
The different orientation of the two economies, with Luxembourg primarily focused on the financial 
sector, while industry accounts for a large proportion of Germany‘s GDP may be driving these results. 
The low stock market activity could be an important factor for the non-synchronisation among the NMS; 
thereby causing the transmission of shocks to take longer. The cases of Poland (lags by 5 days) and Latvia 
(lags by 412 days) could further highlight this point as the former‘s economy is the largest of all NMS, 
while Latvia is one of the smallest. 
 
B. Duration and Intensity 
The duration measures further illustrate the differential crisis experiences of the EU-27 nation groups, 
with the EU-15 staying for an average of 910 days (92.07%) in crisis regime, as opposed to the 608 days 
(85.43%) for the NMS, which corresponds to a significantly prolonged crisis duration. The intensity 
measure also confirms that the severity of the financial crisis has been stronger in the EU-15 than the 
NMS, as evident from the higher average intensity values (67.10% vs 57.76%) respectively. These 
findings may be attributed to the increased financial integration of the EU-15 compared to past crises, 
particularly in respect of the Eurozone, which allows for faster propagation of economic and financial 
shocks. Nevertheless, the finding provides prima facie evidence of a ―two-speed EU‖ with heterogeneous 
levels of financial integration, which calls for enhanced policies that cater for the distinctive features of 
the EU nations in periods of crisis. The Scandinavian group weathers the crisis better than both the Core 
EU and the PIIGS as evident by the lower intensity values. The severity of the crisis in the PIIGS group 
                                                     
25 The four phases of the GFC are: i) Initial financial turmoil (1/8/2007 – 15/9/2008); ii) Sharp financial market deterioration 
(16/9/2008 – 31/12/2008); iii) Macroeconomic deterioration (1/10/2009 – 31/3/2009); iv) Stabilisation and tentative signs of 
recovery (1/4/2009 – 1/11/2009) and have been used in Baur (2012) and Kenourgios (2014) among others. The four phases of the 
GFC do not cover the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis. 
26 It would be interesting to compare whether this time lag increased/decreased compared to previous crises, however most of the 
research is not directly comparable for several reasons. Not all crises are directly comparable as they could be regional specific 
(i.e., 1997 East Asian) or not directly linked to economic/financial characteristics (i.e., 9/11 terrorist attacks). Furthermore, many 
studies look at spillover effects following a crisis, usually around financially developed countries (see for example, King and 
Wadwani, 1990). 
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may be attributed to investors penalising markets with poor macroeconomic fundamentals, policies and 
institutions (Bekaert et al., 2014). The crisis duration and intensity for Greece is interesting insofar as the 
country records the highest duration (97.43%) and lowest intensity (60.03%) value among the PIIGS 
group. In Greece the global financial crisis brought to surface chronic debt, fiscal and structural problems. 
However, unlike Ireland where the financial and banking sectors were hit, in Greece these sectors were 
relatively unaffected owing in part to the low exposure to securitisation products. Furthermore, the Greek 
stock market has lower capitalisation than the EU average, and is less interconnected even within the 
PIIGS group (see also section C) with limited presence of institutional investors. The high exposure of 
Austria and Belgium to the NMS, as identified in Árvai et al., (2009), may be a reason for their relatively 
high crisis intensity score within the Core EU group. 
The RAMS II group has weathered the crisis better than the RAMS I group, as evidenced from the lower 
intensity values. However, the duration of the crisis shows no significant differences between the two 
groups, albeit there are a few exceptions of nations residing longer in the crisis regime. Cyprus, for 
example, records the highest crisis duration among the NMS. There are many economic reasons that 
could explain differentiated responses to the crisis at the nation group level. Nations in the RAMS I group 
are in a better economic position relatively to those of the RAMS II with respect to the size of the 
economy (GDP figures are $88.27bil vs $25.03bil respectively) and living standards (around $2,500 
difference in GDP per capita). The delayed start (i.e., by approximately 3 years) of the EU accession talks 
of the RAMS II group could also be a contributing factor. 
C. Unified Crisis Performance 
The synchronisation, duration and intensity measures reflect different facets of a nation‘s unified crisis 
performance (UCP). As such the information they contain, if combined, can provide a systematic ranking 
about how EU-27 nations fared during the crisis. To achieve this we consider a principal component 
analysis in two phases. In the first phase we define a single principal component       , scaled between 
zero and one, where higher values indicate nations that fared worse during the crisis. In the second phase 
and in a similar manner, two principal components               are retained.
27
  
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
Figure 3 ranks the EU-27 nations ranking according to the        indicator. At the extreme ends are 
Luxembourg and Malta, with the former being the worst affected by the global financial crisis. The figure 
also marks a clear separation between the EU-15 and the NMS groups with the former in the leftmost part 
of the graph. Figure 4 illustrates the association of the nations in terms of the               indicators. 
Of interest are the Core EU and the PIIGS groups that appear clustered together (top-right), illustrating 
that the crisis hit them in a similar manner. The lower association of Greece relatively to the other PIIGS, 
which was highlighted previously, is here more evident. The NMS are high variable with regards to the 
UCP as evident by their random scatter. Other notable patterns are the intense degree of crisis exposure in 
the RAMS I compared to the RAMS II group.  
                                                     
27 The first principal component accounts for 51.66% of the total variance, while with a second the total variance explained 
reaches 89.35%. For the case of the two principal components we apply an orthogonal varimax rotation that facilitates the 
interpretation of the components. The first component explains synchronisation/intensity of the crisis, while the second 
component captures the crisis duration. Principal component analysis has been advocated in Bekaert et al. (2014) among others. 
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D. Credit Rating Scores 
Do changes in credit rating scores match the crisis transition dates of the different nations? Table 6 shows 
that credit rating scores responses vary across nation groups. Credit rating scores remain unchanged for 
most of the Core EU and the Scandinavian nations. By contrast, the PIIGS, the Baltics, the RAMS I and II 
groups show credit score downgrades. The lag between the credit score downgrades and the crisis 
transition dates range between 210 – 450 days, meaning that downgrades could potentially act as an 
upcoming crisis indicator. Subsequent downgrades that could warn about the severity of the crisis occur 
with a higher delay. For example, the PIIGS were downgraded, on average, around 750 days after they 
entered the crisis which could have, in part, affected the awareness of the severity of the crisis, a fact 
evidenced by the lack of any meaningful relation between credit rating score changes and the crisis 
duration and intensity measures. By contrast, for the NMS credit scores are more responsive, ranging 
between 30 – 300 days. The reason for this difference may be due to the fact that NMS were monitored 
more closely (between 180 – 365 days gap between last update of credit rating score and the crisis 
transition date) than the EU-15. One possible explanation is that new entrants‘ economies are not a 
familiar territory for the credit rating agencies.  
5.2 Correlation and Contagion Effects 
Table 7, Panel A, Columns II – III show the EU-wide average conditional correlations for the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods respectively. Columns IV and V report the median and mean changes between the pre-
crisis and post-crisis periods of the two correlation indicators per nation group. Column VI shows the 
standard deviation of the correlation changes in every group. Column VII lists the significance t-test 
values for the mean change between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Table 7, Panel B reports the same 
statistics for the intra-EU average conditional correlations. As can be seen from the table, the results are 
mixed. 
[Table 7 here] 
The EU-wide correlations are higher for the EU-15 than the NMS, possibly due to the longer presence of 
the former nations in the European Union and the Eurozone. The intra-EU correlations show that nations 
in the Scandinavian group are the most interconnected, while those in the RAMS II group are the least. 
During the crisis all the nation groups - but the RAMS II - show evidence of an increase in the EU-wide 
correlations, verifying financial contagion financial contagion for the respective groups. These results are 
in line with the studies of (Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011), which verify adverse crisis effects and the 
presence of contagion for the CEE region, and also the vulnerability of emerging markets to crises 
(Kenourgios and Padhi, 2012). Intra-EU correlations also increase and indicate the presence of financial 
contagion within the respective country groups. Comparing the magnitude of the EU-wide and the intra-
EU correlation changes is suggestive of a varying degree of contagion across the nation groups. Therefore 
the crisis has had a differentiated impact upon the EU, a finding that is in line with Gębka and Karoglou 
(2013), who take a more globalised perspective.  
The evidence shows that the Scandinavian, the PIIGS and the Baltic groups become notionally aligned to 
financial markets beyond their respective groups, potentially showing evidence of a higher 
interconnectedness to the EU as evidenced by the relatively larger increase in the EU-wide compared to 
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the intra-EU measure. For the Scandinavian group, the higher alignment with stock markets outside of 
their group could relate to the important trade linkages they enjoy with other EU nations. For the Baltic 
group it could be in part attributed to the economic instability in Latvia, the great penetration of foreign 
banks and the close financial links with the Scandinavian countries (Estonia, 2013). For the PIIGS group 
it may be plausibly linked to the EU actions (e.g., bailouts, financial support packages, economic 
monitoring) with respect to these crisis-hit countries.  
By contrast, the opposite is shown for the Core EU and the RAMS groups where the stock markets show 
evidence of retrenching into national borders. This is likely to be a story of two extremes, where on the 
one hand the nations belonging to the Core EU group have well-established financial centres, share a 
great commitment to the ―European identity‖ (Eurobarometer, 2013) and act as an economic bellwether 
for the rest of the EU. On the other hand, for the RAMS I and II groups the explanation may rest with 
their lesser integration (partly attributed to their recent acceptance) with the EU-15 (i.e., in respect of 
labour markets, retail markets and financial markets) and their weaker sense of ―European identity‖ 
(Eurobarometer, 2013). 
5.3 Crisis Intensity and Economic Indicators  
In the pre-crisis period, investors were driven by the low-interest rate environment. In pursuit of higher 
yields they switched from developed to developing markets and, within the EU, from the so-called ―core‖ 
(i.e., EU-15) to the periphery (i.e., NMS). The global financial crisis brought to the surface the risks 
associated with enhanced rewards. This led investors to rebalance their portfolio positions, shifting back 
to the perceived safety of the ―strong‖ states (i.e., Germany, the Netherlands).  Under duress, market 
participants compared the relative strength of the EU states, and reacted accordingly. In doing so, they 
gave support to the notion that the intensity of a nation‘s crisis experience is related to the quality of its 
economic fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2014). As ―stronger‖ economies weathered the crisis, others were 
targeted as the weaker links in the chain. 
We consider a Spearman rank correlation measure to analyse the impact of economic indicators on the 
unified crisis performance (UCP) indicator. Our set of macroeconomic variables includes: i) the current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP; ii) central government debt as a percentage of GDP; iii) the ratio 
of total labour costs to real output – reflecting cost competitiveness; iv) the real effective exchange rate – 
as a proxy for competitiveness; v) the percentage of value added to GDP by industrial and manufacturing 
activities – as a proxy for industrialization; vi) a Eurozone (single currency) dummy. Annual data are 
sourced from the IMF, the World Bank and OECD for the period of the study. We use the average levels 
of these measures over the full study period.   
Table 8 reports the estimated correlation coefficients and diagnostics from our analysis. The results show 
industrialisation, the Eurozone dummy, current account balance and the real effective exchange rate to be 
statistically significant with the expected signs. Low levels of current account debt, real effective 
exchange rate and a higher degree of industrialisation contribute favourably to lessen the impact of crisis. 
Thus, for example, both Germany and the Czech Republic (i.e., both industry intensive) enter the crisis 
with lags of three and five months respectively from their respective nation groups. They also had a 
relative less severe crisis experience than, for example, finance-oriented Luxembourg and debt-ridden 
Greece. Eurozone members are confirmed to have been more adversely hit by the global financial crisis. 
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[Table 8 here] 
5.4 Conceptual and Empirical Issues  
When a period of economic growth comes to an abrupt end, economic policy becomes focused upon 
moderating the severity of the ensuing downturn. The recession that is experienced across nations may be 
differentially exacerbated by the extent of contagion, which is by no means homogeneous as evidenced by 
the measures we deployed in previous sections of this paper.  That broad term, contagion, encompasses a 
variety of inter-related causes and consequences. These include the collapse of a speculative ―bubble‖, the 
negative income multiplier, de-leveraging of bank credit, profit-taking (or damage limitation) in equity 
markets, a downgrade of credit ratings, rising debt-to GDP ratios and sovereign debt restructuring. 
Moreover, in applying remedial policy measures, sovereign treasuries and their companion central banks 
will have different strengths and their respective interventions will be conducted with varying degrees of 
understanding and expertise. The single euro currency per se may have hindered efficient market 
adjustments. Where, within the US and the UK, there are inter-regional permanent fiscal transfers these 
are non-existent within the Eurozone.
28
 The cliché is that one size must fit all; which means that although 
the ECB might deliver a general level of Eurozone prices that is stable, unique structural changes within 
national economies may require ―internal revaluations‖; i.e., individual price and wage realignments. Our 
analysis engages with that complex detail only with the broadest of brush-strokes, but the relevance upon 
the crisis experience in the PIIGS is apparent.  
In Greece, social welfare and pensions were not funded by tax, so euros were paid out on the basis of a 
growing sovereign debt at the expense of labour and pension reforms that may have increased the 
competitiveness of the Greek economy.
29
 Euros were used to finance import expenditures and this showed 
up as increasing Target 2 imbalances for the Bank of Greece. Similar practices were typical of the other 
PIIGS nations to a varying extent. In parallel, the ECB‘s posture that all Eurozone-wide sovereign debt 
bears virtually no risk (as evidenced by its stance on risk capital regulation and as liquidity provider, see 
Castellacci and Choi, 2005) allowed market participants to presume that cross-border liabilities would be 
guaranteed, either via government intervention and international bail-out programmes; or indeed that risk 
differentials had been factored out completely (Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001). Consequently, financial 
institutions increased their exposure to the PIIGS, while the ability to contain potential contagious 
damage was decreasing (Castellacci and Choi, 2015). It is in the nature of markets that the refinancing 
difficulties of a single nation cause participants to re-evaluate their perceptions of other nations, and their 
reactions are the drivers of contagion (Bekaert et al., 2011; Missio and Watzka, 2011). To the sensitivity 
of market participants‘ reactions, catalytic was the role of the Lehman collapse (September 2008) that, 
economic consequences aside, raptured the belief that one of the largest, triple-AAA accredited financial 
institutions cannot go bust. 
In the EU, the game was set and in 2009 the newly elected Greek government revised upwards the budget 
deficit to 12.7%, over four times higher than the maximum allowed for Eurozone members, while the 
                                                     
28 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), two institutions that would 
allow the transfer of funds between EU nations for the short and long-term stability respectively came into force in 2013. 
29 Eventually such reforms were imposed through a number of austerity packages by the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (commonly referred to as Troika). Kosmidou et al. (2015) provide a nice exposition 
of the Greek crisis. 
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European Commission condemns Greece for falsifying its statistics
30
 (i.e., Greek statistics scandal). 
Market nervousness unveiled amidst these developments with Greece losing the A-grade in credit ratings. 
By late, 2010 markets realised that fiscal conditions in the PIIGS were much more precarious than had 
been expected and further credit score downgrades ensued. Other of the PIIGS would follow suit as 
markets began to speculate on the next weakest link.  
As market participants unwounded their positions, they facilitated the contagion spread process. This is 
particularly evident in the case of the NMS. Relatedly, Arvai et al., (2009) report that in most of the 
NMS, Austrian, Belgian, German and Italian financial institutions commanded the majority of the 
banking assets. While the expansion of credit to the private sector was aiding growth, financial stability 
was undermined (Cottarelli et al., 2003). NMS nations that were dependent on a single lender were 
affected later but at a higher intensity compared to countries with more diversified sources of funds 
(Árvai et al., 2009). This may be a plausible explanation for countries (e.g., Estonia, Hungary) that 
entered the crisis later and at a high crisis intensity score. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of the global financial crisis on EU stock markets using an ADCC- 
GARCH model with a Markov switching component. Using data for the period 2001 to 2011, the work 
seeks to establish when each of Europe‘s stock markets entered a crisis regime, how long each market 
remained in that regime and how severe was the crisis. The current EU Member States are a diverse group 
with very different equity markets. For example, the markets in the countries that acceded in the last 
decade are much less developed, both in terms of size and activity, than those in the EU-15. It is therefore 
pertinent to question whether markets in the two blocs of countries display symmetric responses to such a 
shock as the global financial crisis. Of particular interest is any evidence of a spread in the pattern of the 
effects across the EU stock markets. Such evidence would indicate contagion and provide some indication 
of the degree of equity market integration in Europe. 
The results presented in the paper uphold the presence of contagion. In broad terms and as expected, 
markets in the EU-15 were affected earlier than those in the NMS, a finding which reflects the greater 
exposure of the older members to world markets. Moreover, the EU-15 experienced shaper falls in 
financial markets than the NMS, and they also recovered more slowly. Even within the EU-15 nations, 
differences did emerge where, not surprisingly, the PIIGS countries were most affected by the crisis. The 
NMS that were frontrunners in the accession process were also hit by the crisis earlier than those that 
entered into membership negotiations later. Differences also emerged regarding both the severity and the 
duration of the crisis in these nations. The work also revealed that the nature of the relationships between 
EU stock markets changed in the aftermath of the crisis with markets in Scandinavia, the PIIGS countries 
and the leading NMS economies becoming more closely aligned. 
While many factors doubtless contribute to explain why EU stock markets displayed differing reactions to 
the crisis, attention here focussed on a number of key macroeconomic indicators. Results from a simple 
                                                     
30 The well-known scandal with Greece manipulating its financials (widely known as ―Greek statistics‖) led to substantial 
reforms at the EU level whereby EU governments will have to sign written pledges that they will not make political appointments 
in the sector and on the independence of national number-grinders more broadly (Pop, 2012). 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
20 
 
regression exercise revealed that both a high degree of industrialisation and a low level of government 
debt served to lessen the impact of the crisis. From a policy perspective, this suggests two lessons. First, it 
reinforces the EU‘s desire for Member States to maintain a sound fiscal policy, as detailed in the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Second, it might make governments in the NMS in particular think twice about 
allowing manufacturing to decline as the growth of services has been favoured, which has been the case 
in certain EU-15 nations. 
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Tables 
Table 1. EU Indices, Symbols and Sources 
 Nations Index Symbol Source 
E
U
-1
5
 
Scandinavian 
Denmark OMXC 20 DKKFXIN Stockholmsborsen 
Finland OMXH HEXINDX Stockholmsborsen 
Sweden OMXC 30 SWEDOMX Stockholmsborsen 
Core EU 
Austria ATX ATXINDX Wiener Boerse 
Belgium BEL 20 BGBEL20 BEL 
France CAC 40 FRCAC40 Euronext Paris 
Germany DAX 30 DAXINDX Deutsche Borse 
Luxembourg SE General LUXGENI Luxembourg Stock Exchange 
Netherlands AEX AMSTEOE Euronext Amsterdam 
UK FTSE All Share FTALLSH United Kingdom Stock 
Exchange 
PIIGS 
Portugal PSI General POPSIGN Euronext Lisbon 
Italy FTSE MIB FTSEMIB FTSE 
Ireland SE Overall ISEQUIT Irish Stock Exchange 
Greece ATHEX Composite GRAGENL Athens Stock Exchange 
Spain IBEX 35 IBEX35 Spanish Exchanges 
N
ew
 M
em
b
er
 S
ta
te
s 
(N
M
S
) 
Baltics 
Estonia OMX Tallin ESTALSE Stockholmsborsen 
Latvia OMX Riga RIGSEIN Stockholmsborsen 
Lithuania OMX Vilnius LNVILSE Stockholmsborsen 
RAMS I 
Czech Republic SE PX CZPXIDX Prague Stock Exchange 
Hungary BUX BUXINDX Budapest Stock Exchange 
Poland Warsaw General 
Index 
POLWIGI Warsaw Stock Exchange 
Slovenia DS Market TOTXRSJ Datastream 
RAMS II 
Bulgaria SE SOFIX BSSOFIX Bulgaria Stock Exchange 
Cyprus FTSE Cyprus SE 20 FTSEC20 FTSE 
Malta SE MSE MALTAIX Borza ta' Malta 
Romania BET RMBETRL BET Indices 
Slovakia SAX 16 SXSAX16 Bratislava Stock Exchange 
Notes: All data downloaded from Datastream 
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Table 2. Macroeconomic Indicators 
Nations Population GDP GDP GDP/capita Industry  CAB Debt Labour Cost REER Market Cap 
 Millions Constant 
2000 $bil 
Real 
Growth % 
Constant 
2005 $bil, PPP 
% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP %  % of GDP 
Scandinavian 
Denmark 5.54 171.23 2.09 32,608 40.06 3.80 41.30 71.90 100.18 74.66 
Finland 5.36 145.56 -8.20 31,532 56.57 3.26 44.94 66.23 100.11 49.48 
Sweden 9.38 1,698.16 1.25 33,686 47.52 8.38 47.21 68.84 98.62 126.89 
Core EU 
Austria 8.38 222.63 1.96 35,266 49.65 2.85 67.92 69.06 99.10 17.99 
Belgium 10.88 266.51 2.18 32,824 41.52 0.44 91.27 70.04 99.46 57.62 
France 64.87 1,484.70 -2.73 29,647 34.63 -1.24 74.34 69.27 98.72 75.25 
Germany 81.70 2,071.24 -4.72 33,498 51.74 6.12 44.76 68.88 99.06 43.20 
Luxembourg 0.51 27.38 3.52 71,161 26.04 8.61 8.17 58.54 100.36 183.55 
Netherlands 16.61 440.12 1.77 36,915 38.60 7.20 53.01 68.89 98.72 84.40 
UK 62.22 302.11 2.92 32,187 37.76 -2.35 56.78 71.85 94.29 138.33 
PIIGS 
Portugal 10.64 124.99 1.33 21,658 41.03 -10.36 74.46 68.44 99.47 35.88 
Italy 60.48 1,125.08 1.30 26,753 46.14 -2.58 112.29 68.07 99.06 15.51 
Ireland 4.48 123.81 -1.04 35,183 62.72 -2.59 49.25 56.17 100.02 16.54 
Greece 11.32 158.67 -4.47 24,990 29.21 -11.42 125.68 67.00 100.74 23.83 
Spain 46.08 712.34 -0.14 26,934 44.91 -6.99 44.56 65.11 100.36 83.25 
Baltics 
Estonia 1.34 77.63 1.78 16,353 41.47 -5.99 6.07 63.14 n/a 12.10 
Latvia 2.24 11.22 -0.34 12,938 34.86 -8.73 34.21 58.04 n/a 5.21 
Lithuania 3.32 17.53 1.33 15,390 50.37 -6.16 27.96 56.30 n/a 15.59 
RAMS I 
Czech Republic 10.52 19.21 2.32 22,557 63.34 -2.68 24.35 59.37 106.97 22.41 
Hungary 10.01 57.01 1.17 16,514 47.20 -3.95 70.99 64.28 98.98 21.25 
Poland 38.18 250.89 3.82 17,336 48.46 -4.72 37.17 58.43 101.42 40.60 
Slovenia 2.05 26.00 1.18 24,982 53.32 -2.42 n/a 72.90 n/a 19.74 
RAMS II 
Bulgaria 7.54 8.25 0.20 11,486 52.32 -12.76 14.74 54.40 107.40 15.25 
Cyprus 1.10 12.17 -1.02 25,803 25.21 -8.80 145.22 62.22 99.89 19.94 
Malta 0.41 4.43 -2.12 22,102 58.45 -5.86 80.28 n/a 99.72 24.81 
Romania 21.44 56.53 0.95 10,929 53.88 -8.18 n/a 51.59 98.76 20.04 
Slovakia 5.43 43.78 0.50 19,244 59.94 -4..35 39.19 50.75 108.72 4.66 
Notes: Data are 2010, except when in italics which indicates data averaged over the 2001-2011 period. CAB is the Current Account Balance. REER is the Real Effective Exchange Rate. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of EU Stock Markets  
Nations Mean Volatility JB VaR 95% EMH Test 
 % Annualised %      
Scandinavian -0.0089 25.35      
Denmark 0.0040 21.51 4,314
***
 -8.15 -1.079   
Finland -0.0280 28.87 3,695
***
 -11.27 -2.690
***
   
Sweden -0.0026 25.68 1,533
***
 -7.60 0.101   
Core EU -0.0022 22.26      
Austria 0.0230 24.14 7,717
***
 -9.33 -1.322   
Belgium -0.0122 21.58 4,556
***
 -7.51 -1.757
*
   
France -0.0226 24.88 3,278
***
 -8.20 1.188   
Germany 0.0426 8.95 14,598
***
 -4.29 -7.997
***
   
Luxembourg -0.0151 30.76 3,422
***
 -16.46 -2.138
**
   
Netherlands -0.0287 25.65 4,027
***
 -8.99 -0.788   
UK -0.0021 19.87 4,482
***
 -7.56 -0.753   
PIIGS -0.0246 23.08      
Portugal -0.0027 17.27 17,629
***
 -7.33 -4.430
***
   
Italy -0.0370 23.98 4,204
***
 -7.83 0.796   
Ireland -0.0287 24.19 6,747
***
 -10.62 -3.284
***
   
Greece -0.0517 25.77 3,432
***
 -8.36 -5.293
***
   
Spain -0.0027 24.21 4,631
***
 -8.37 0.651   
Baltics 0.0426 21.29      
Estonia 0.0487 19.21 7,497
***
 -6.48 -7.371
***
   
Latvia 0.0324 25.35 2,459
***
 -12.97 1.697
*
   
Lithuania 0.0467 19.31 4,634
***
 -10.02 -5.964
***
   
RAMS I 0.0226 21.79      
Czech Republic 0.0251 24.30 2,064
***
 -12.49 -1.399   
Hungary 0.0261 26.13 4,927
***
 -10.59 0.011   
Poland 0.0277 21.11 1,074
***
 -7.10 0.396   
Slovenia 0.0115 15.60 1,084
***
 -7.17 -7.741
***
   
RAMS II 0.0158 24.29      
Bulgaria 0.0424 27.71 9,527
***
 -16.69 -5.737
***
   
Cyprus -0.0667 34.76 2,264
***
 -10.79 -2.881
***
   
Malta -0.0026 12.07 7,630
***
 -4.51 -9.796
***
   
Romania 0.0735 27.82 6,162
***
 -11.86 -5.864
***
   
Slovakia 0.0324 19.09 4,577
***
 -10.86 -2.533
**
   
Notes: EMH test is the z-statistic for the Runs test of the efficient market hypothesis. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 denote 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Univariate Markov-Switching GARCH Models 
            
    Calm          Crisis         Goodness-of-fit Transition Probabilities 
  θ0 ω0 α0 β0  θ1 ω1 α1 β1  AIC BIC LR Test [0,0] [1,1] 
S
c
a
n
/a
n
 Denmark 0.0126*** 0.0005*** 0.9992*** 0.0000  0.0097*** 0.0003*** 0.8625*** 0.0000  -10.0749 -10.0537 7716.50*** 0.9792 0.9685 
Finland 0.0172*** 0.0005*** 1.0276*** 0.0000  0.0099*** 0.0002*** 0.9700*** 0.0471***  -9.2538 -9.2326 6491.40*** 0.9946 0.9899 
Sweden 1.2665 1.2865 0.0000 0.0000  0.0125*** 0.0005*** 1.0577*** 0.0000  -8.2689 -8.2477 4213.30*** 0.8883 0.9996 
                           
C
o
r
e 
E
U
 
Austria 0.0154*** 0.0008*** 0.9788*** 0.0000  0.0102*** 0.0004*** 0.8341*** 0.0406  -9.8016 -9.7804 8618.80*** 0.9835 0.9863 
Belgium 0.0140*** 0.0009*** 0.9848*** 0.0000  0.0085*** 0.0004*** 0.8927*** 0.0000  -9.6207 -9.5995 7117.90*** 0.9881 0.9861 
France 0.0150*** 0.0008*** 0.9886*** 0.0122  0.0094*** 0.0004*** 0.9778*** 0.0000  -9.5107 -9.4895 7335.90*** 0.9907 0.9873 
Germany 0.0161*** 0.0009*** 1.0023*** 0.0050  0.0105*** 0.0005*** 0.9397*** 0.0046  -9.3753 -9.3541 6870.60*** 0.9896 0.9890 
Luxembourg 0.0172*** 0.0019*** 1.0230*** 0.0000  0.0101*** 0.0007*** 0.9549*** 0.0000  -8.4854 -8.4642 7245.00*** 0.9748 0.9708 
Netherlands 0.0146*** 0.0009*** 0.9827*** 0.0000  0.0091*** 0.0004*** 0.8514*** 0.0437  -9.3481 -9.3269 7472.20*** 0.9870 0.9839 
UK 0.0121*** 0.0005*** 1.0053*** 0.0195  0.0079*** 0.0003*** 0.9497*** 0.0000  -9.8138 -9.7926 7604.10*** 0.9796 0.9785 
 
 
                         
P
II
G
S
 
Portugal 0.0130*** 0.0008*** 0.9518*** 0.0000  0.0084*** 0.0004*** 0.9009*** 0.0000  -9.9347 -9.9135 7379.80*** 0.9870 0.9868 
Italy 0.0142*** 0.0007*** 1.0547*** 0.0036  0.0090*** 0.0004*** 0.9478*** 0.0138  -9.3457 -9.3245 7223.30*** 0.9903 0.9873 
Ireland 0.0155*** 0.0009*** 0.9699*** 0.0165  0.0092*** 0.0003*** 0.8582*** 0.0870***  -9.6006 -9.5794 7631.80*** 0.9816 0.9818 
Greece 0.0203*** 0.0007*** 1.0325*** 0.0009  0.0108*** 0.0003*** 0.9950*** 0.0153  -9.5309 -9.5097 7251.40*** 0.9869 0.9900 
Spain 0.0157*** 0.0007*** 0.9941*** 0.0006  0.0088*** 0.0003*** 0.9523*** 0.0113  -9.5935 -9.5723 7497.50*** 0.9876 0.9809 
                           
B
a
lt
ic
s Estonia 0.0137
*** 0.0006*** 1.0384*** 0.0000  0.0096*** 0.0004*** 0.8737*** 0.0740***  -9.9139 -9.8927 6367.00*** 0.9796 0.9804 
Latvia 0.0165*** 0.0011*** 0.9433*** 0.0000  0.0105*** 0.0005*** 0.9288*** 0.0000  -9.6356 -9.6144 8111.60*** 0.9555 0.9684 
Lithuania 0.0117*** 0.0006*** 0.8749*** 0.0051  0.0090*** 0.0003*** 1.1777*** 0.0000  -10.0327 -10.0115 7417.10*** 0.9672 0.9389 
 
 
            
 
           
R
A
M
S
 I
 Czech R‘blic 0.0156
*** 0.0008*** 0.9358*** 0.0000  0.0110*** 0.0005*** 0.9502*** 0.0000  -9.6168 -9.5956 8207.10*** 0.9706 0.9697 
Hungary 0.0196*** 0.0010*** 0.9833*** 0.0157  0.0138*** 0.0005*** 0.8771*** 0.0000  -9.2964 -9.2751 7542.60*** 0.9740 0.9772 
Poland 0.0192*** 0.0008*** 1.0119*** 0.0022  0.0136*** 0.0005*** 0.9221*** 0.0000  -9.6757 -9.6545 6786.10*** 0.9777 0.9900 
Slovenia 0.8314*** 0.0712*** 0.9710*** 0.0000  0.0095*** 0.0004*** 0.8632*** 0.0000  -10.1958 -10.1789 6047.20*** 0.9796 1.0000 
                           
R
A
M
S
 I
I 
Bulgaria 0.0173*** 0.0011*** 1.0251*** 0.0000  0.0100*** 0.0006*** 0.9911*** 0.0000  -8.9367 -8.9155 7293.10*** 0.9739 0.9743 
Cyprus 0.0219*** 0.0013*** 0.9831*** 0.0025  0.0128*** 0.0006*** 1.0037*** 0.0000  -8.4467 -8.4255 5787.50*** 0.9796 0.9658 
Malta 0.0102*** 0.0004*** 1.0464*** 0.0000  0.0081*** 0.0002*** 0.8953*** 0.0000  -11.2463 -11.2251 5180.60*** 0.9714 0.9794 
Romania 0.0190*** 0.0009*** 0.9860*** 0.0000  0.0133*** 0.0006*** 0.9768*** 0.0000  -9.0523 -9.0310 6753.10*** 0.9778 0.9787 
Slovakia 0.0140*** 0.0001*** 1.0436*** 0.0000  0.0120*** 0.0001*** 1.0283*** 0.0000  -10.4816 -10.4604 5915.30*** 0.9880 0.9854 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and goodness-of-fit statistics for the univariate Markov-Switching GARCH models fitted on each of the 27 nations of our sample. Estimation period is          –       
             . The model estimated for every nation is given by:                                
             
         
          . AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Bayesian Information 
Criteria respectively. The LR column reports the chi-square statistics for the linearity test. Columns [0,0] and [1,1] denote the transition probabilities for the volatility process staying in the calm and crisis regime 
respectively over two consecutive time periods. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Multivariate Conditional Correlation Models Estimation Results. 
 DCC(1,1)  ADCC(1,1,1) 
 Coefficient Standard Error  Coefficient Standard Error 
a 0.0053
***
 0.0003  0.0049
***
 0.0003 
b 0.9910
***
 0.0007  0.9909
***
 0.0008 
g — —  0.0025*** 0.0005 
      
AIC -179.12   -179.36  
BIC -179.11   -179.35  
LogL 318,380.74   318,813.47  
LR Test —   865.46***  
T 2,800   2,800  
N 27   27  
Notes: The table reports coefficients, standard errors and goodness of fit statistics for the multivariate DCC-GARCH and 
ADCC-GARCH models fitted on the sample. AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria respectively 
while LogL denotes the log likelihood. LR Test is the likelihood ratio test between the DCC-GARCH and ADCC-GARCH 
models. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the ADCC-GARCH is a significant improvement over the DCC-
GARCH.  ***,**,* : denote significance at the 1, 5, 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 6: Crisis Transition Dates, Synchronization, Duration and Intensity measures 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII   IX X  
 Nation Crisis Transition 
Date 
Sync 
(Days) 
Duration 
(Days) 
Duration 
(%) 
Intensity Credit Score Change  Credit Score Lead/Lag 
 (%) pre post   pre post  
S
c
a
n
/a
n
 Denmark 10/08/2007 9 940 95.43 56.70 — —   — —  
Finland 13/08/2007 12 831 80.92 52.62 — —   — —  
Sweden 27/07/2007 -5 631 61.62 62.94 — —   — —  
Scandinavian  9 831 80.92 56.70     — —  
C
o
r
e 
E
U
 
Austria 27/07/2007 -5 956 93.54 67.10 — —   — —  
Belgium 26/07/2007 -6 930 92.08 73.55 02/05/2006 23/05/2011   450 1,397  
France 09/08/2007 8 905 92.07 66.92 — —   — —  
Germany 06/11/2007 97 677 75.73 71.97 — —   — —  
Luxembourg 01/03/2007 -153 972 92.40 73.75 — —   — —  
Netherlands 10/08/2007 9 880 88.71 71.61 — —   — —  
UK 26/07/2007 -6 932 95.20 61.21 — 14/03/2012   — 1,693  
Core EU  -5 930 92.08 71.61     450 (1.23) 1,545 (4.23)  
P
II
G
S
 
Portugal 10/08/2007 9 915 91.50 64.50 01/05/2007 03/09/2009   101 755  
Italy 10/08/2007 9 969 93.71 75.73 19/10/2006 07/10/2011   295 1519  
Greece 16/01/2008 168 873 97.43 60.03 05/03/2007 20/10/2008   317 278  
Ireland 27/07/2007 -5 888 84.98 73.68 21/09/2000 06/03/2009   2,500 588  
Spain 02/08/2007 1 910 91.73 69.84 10/12/2003 28/05/2010   1,331 1,030  
PIIGS  9 910 91.73 69.84     317 (0.87) 755 (2.07)  
B
a
lt
ic
s 
Estonia 21/07/2008 355 653 91.71 58.89 31/01/2008 03/10/2008   172 74  
Latvia 16/09/2008 412 573 86.04 47.67 31/01/2008 03/10/2008   229 17  
Lithuania 09/09/2008 405 550 94.83 23.82 07/12/2007 03/10/2008   277 24  
Baltics  405 573 91.71 47.67     229 (0.63) 24 (0.07)  
R
A
M
S
 I
 
Czech 09/01/2008 161 631 84.81 56.62 26/08/2005 04/03/2008   866 55  
Hungary 28/11/2007 119 785 87.32 72.43 05/11/2007 15/10/2008   23 322  
Poland 06/08/2007 5 584 61.47 60.37 18/01/2007 —   200 —  
Slovenia 04/01/2007 -209 480 41.45 59.05 12/07/2006 28/09/2011   176 1728  
RAMS I 62 608 73.14 59.71     188 (0.52) 322 (0.88)  
R
A
M
S
 I
I 
Bulgaria 12/11/2007 103 525 61.98 70.49 17/08/2005 30/01/2008   817 79  
Cyprus 17/01/2008 169 873 99.32 16.52 12/07/2007 31/05/2011   189 1230  
Malta 29/07/2008 363 448 67.57 35.76 12/07/2007 —   383 —  
Romania 07/01/2008 159 636 75.27 70.46 31/08/2006 31/01/2008   494 24  
Slovakia 18/09/2008 414 640 88.03 36.46 08/07/2008 —   72 —  
RAMS II  169 636 71.42 53.46     383 (1.05) 79 (0.22)  
 EU-15  8 910 92.07 67.10     384 (1.05) 1,030 (2.82)  
 NMS  165*** 608*** 85.43* 57.76***     215 (0.59) 74 (0.20)  
Notes: Crisis Transition Date (CTD) is identified by the MS-GARCH model. Credit Score Change (CSC) refers to sovereign credit score change date pre and post the CTD in every nation. Credit score ratings 
are provided by Fitch ratings. Credit Score Lead/Lag refers to the difference, expressed in days (years), between the Credit Score Change and the Crisis Transition Date. Credit rating scores provided by Fitch 
ratings. Numbers in bold represent nation group median values. ***, **, * denote statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively for the Mann-Whitney test for the equality of medians. 
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Table 7. EU-wide and intra-EU correlation measures 
I II III  IV V VI VII 
Nation Groups Average Correlations  Change in Correlations 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis  Median Mean SD p-value 
Panel A 
Scandinavian 44.12% 45.79%  4.05% 3.80% 0.53% 0.000
***
 
Core EU 39.08% 40.51%  3.92% 4.03% 0.82% 0.000
***
 
PIIGS 43.04% 44.60%  4.32% 3.70% 0.76% 0.000
***
 
Baltics 18.44% 19.87%  9.77% 8.27% 3.39% 0.081
*
 
RAMS I 21.69% 22.70%  5.05% 4.43% 3.65% 0.021
**
 
RAMS II 24.76% 26.30%  7.94% -2.64% 14.84% 0.667 
Panel B 
Scandinavian 68.80% 70.50%  2.62% 2.55% 0.87% 0.015
**
 
Core EU 49.26% 51.00%  4.83% 5.20% 4.45% 0.017
**
 
PIIGS 59.35% 60.54%  3.38% 3.25% 6.57% 0.207 
Baltics 26.83% 28.63%  7.00% 6.38% 1.42% 0.004
***
 
RAMS I 36.48% 38.53%  6.33% 6.15% 2.43% 0.007
***
 
RAMS II 4.72% 5.25%  10.32% -24.58% 78.84% 0.517 
Notes: The table reports the EU-wide (Panel A) and intra-EU (Panel B) average conditional correlation coefficients from the ADCC model pre and post-
crisis for every nation group. The cut-off date separating the pre- and post-crisis periods is the crisis transition date for each country (see Table 5). The 
change in the correlation measures refers to the change between the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
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Table 8. Correlation Analysis 
 UCP  
   
Current Account Balance 0.416
*
  
Central Government Debt  0.093  
Unit Labour Cost 0.144  
REER 0.414
*
  
Industrialisation -0.399
*
  
Eurozone 0.691
***
  
   
Notes: Table reports estimated Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficients. Current Account Balance, Central 
Government Debt and Industrialisation are measured as 
percentage of GDP. REER is the Real Effective Exchange 
Rate. UCP is the Unified Crisis Performance. *, **, ***: 10%, 
5% and 1% statistical significance respectively.  
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Figure 1. Index Prices and Regime identification 
 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
Notes: Identification is done according to Markov Switching models on the ADCC-GARCH Volatility series. The solid black line represents the crisis transition date. Crisis 
transition dates are: France: 09/08/2007; Czech Republic: 01/08/2007. Graphs for the remaining countries are omitted for brevity. 
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Figure 2. Crisis transition dates identified for the nations in the sample 
 
Notes: AUS=Austria; BEL=Belgium; BUL=Bulgaria; CYP=Cyprus; CZE=Czech Republic; DEN=Denmark; EST=Estonia; FIN=Finland; FRA=France; GER=Germany; 
GRE=Greece; HUN=Hungary; IRL=Ireland; ITA=Italy; LAT=Latvia; LIT=Lithuania; LUX=Luxembourg; MAL=Malta; NL=Netherlands; PL=Poland; POR=Portugal; 
ROM=Romania; SLVK=Slovakia; SLVN=Slovenia; SPA=Spain; SWE=Sweden; UK=United Kingdom. 
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Figure 3. Overall Crisis Ranking 
 
Notes: The Overall Crisis Ranking measure is defined as the first principal component from the synchronisation, duration and intensity measures of the nations, and ranges 
between zero and one. Higher values indicate nations that had a more adverse crisis experience. 
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Figure 4. Nation classification using principal components for the crisis measures 
 
Notes: The graph depicts the two retained principal components from the synchronisation, duration and intensity measures of the nations, and range between zero and one. Higher 
values indicate nations that had a more adverse crisis experience. Component 1 represents synchronisation/intensity and Component 2 captures duration of the crisis. Colour codes 
denote Scandinavian (green), Core EU (black), PIIGS (red), Baltics (purple), RAMS I (orange) and RAMS II (blue) groups. 
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Highlights 
 
 We construct measures for the synchronization, duration and intensity of the crisis. 
 We document evidence of a differentiated crisis experience across all EU members. 
 We confirm the presence of financial contagion in five of the six nation groups. 
 Not all of EU‘s stock markets enter the crisis at the same time. 
 On average the nations of the EU-15 are affected earlier than the New Member States. 
